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D E PA R T M E N T  O F  L AW,  
G O L D S M I T H S  U N I V E R S I T Y  
O F  LO N D O N
The Law programme at Goldsmiths, University of 
London brings together cutting-edge academic 
research, teaching expertise and public policy work 
in areas such as criminal law and criminology, media 
law, human rights, artificial intelligence, intellectual 
property, European law and international law.
The programme draws on this wealth of knowledge to 
educate future lawyers looking to tackle society’s 
inequalities, injustices and abuses of power. In tune 
with Goldsmiths’ rich heritage of social awareness 
and social engagement, championing human rights 
and social justice, the Law programme is an intellectual 
space for radical, critical and creative thinking.
For more information on the Law programme at 
Goldsmiths, see: www.gold.ac.uk/law/
B R I TA I N  I N  E U R O P E  T H I N K TA N K
Britain in Europe is an innovative academic 
thinktank which feeds into the Law programme at 
Goldsmiths, University of London.
Britain in Europe’s dynamic membership 
comprises Law academics and academic scholars 
from other disciplines, barristers, solicitors, judges, 
politicians, members of international human rights 
organisations and other third sector experts from 
across Britain and Europe.
Britain in Europe research benefits from a wide range 
of dynamic external collaborations, including with 
Liberty, Justice, the Honourable Society of the Inner 
Temple, the Bar Human Rights Committee, the New 
Europeans, Fair Trials International, the European 
Criminal Bar Association, the Hellenic Criminal Bar 
Association and others.
BiE develops its main research activity in the UK, and 
extends its initiatives to Brussels and Strasbourg, 
particularly at the European Parliament, in close 
collaboration with civil rights organisations and 
former British MEPs.
BiE’s aims are:
• To analyse the socio-legal, economic, and 
political effect of Brexit in the UK and Europe
• To provide a research platform that will 
contribute to the construction of a future 
relationship between the UK and the European 
Union
• To ensure that the UK and European countries 
will remain fully aligned on the protection of 
human rights after Brexit
If you want to communicate with BiE, please feel free 
to email Goldsmiths Law at law@gold.ac.uk
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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
1  Except EU citizens who are eligible and apply for settled or pre-settled status by June 2021.
2 Currently, more than 1.2 million British-born people live in the EU.
The EU Withdrawal Bill, now in the Committee stage 
before the House of Lords, ends EU nationals’ 
freedom of movement, and gives the Home Office 
broad discretion to create new policies applicable  
to all immigrants,1 starting in 2021. 
Overall, the proposed post-Brexit points-based 
immigration system fails to respond to the UK’s 
economic needs and fails to protect workers. It is 
also at odds with the Government’s ‘Global Britain’ 
strategy to attract the ‘brightest and best’ to work 
and study here. Some of the new framework’s most 
troublesome features are as follows:
• The new system is anticipated to produce  
labour shortages in several sectors, including 
those recognised as essential during the 
Covid-19 crisis – notably, social care, farming, 
and food processing. 
• Due to employer sponsorship requirements,  
it is also likely to increase worker exploitation. 
• Lack of access to social benefits and the 
imposition of health surcharge fees will further 
negatively impact immigrants’ lives. 
• It also presents the risk that some immigrants 
will be pushed into undocumented status.
• And, of course, it overlooks the likelihood 
that Britons will be subjected to reciprocal 
restrictions imposed by the EU2.
Although the new system will likely increase 
immigration from outside of Europe, it will 
significantly reduce EU immigration, especially of 
those from Central and Eastern Europe, and of those 
who do not manage to obtain ‘high-skill’, high-paid 
employment. Moreover, EU students will no longer 
be entitled to home-fee status or student loans, and 
thus their enrollment is expected to shrink by 20%, 
exposing the HE sector to an even greater financial 
crisis than it is already experiencing.
The new framework overlooks the fact that EU movers 
have had a significantly positive impact on many 
aspects of British society. Over the years, they have 
created a richer and more diverse British culture. By 
introducing new ideas, expertise, customs and art, 
EU nationals have helped to create the multi-cultural, 
vibrant country that the UK is today. Empirical studies 
have consistently indicated EU movers’ positive 
impact on native Britons’ subjective well-being. In 
part due to their high rates of employment and little 
reliance on public services and social benefits, EU 
movers’ positive contribution on the UK’s public 
finances has also been well documented – in addition 
to their increasing productivity and innovation, and 
reducing prices of personal services. Finally, EU 
students have contributed to all students’ learning 
experience and their skillsets to the UK’s economy. 
Since there are no specific regulations in place yet, 
this briefing urges the Government to draft a 
comprehensive list of shortage occupations to 
include key workers and select positions classified  
as ‘low-skill’. 
The Government should take into account labour 
organisations’ concerns over shortages, while 
recognising studies indicating EU citizens’ 
significant contributions to the public purse. 
EU students should continue to be welcomed in the 
UK, to enrich the teaching and learning environment 
from which British students benefit and to contribute 
their skillsets.
Instead of implementing un-reflexive, arguably 
xenophobic policies in line with the anti-migrant 
climate exploited in the run-up to the Brexit 
referendum, the UK needs to rethink the purpose 
of its immigration controls, and subject them to 
Parliamentary scrutiny rather than being left to the 
whims of the Home Office’s fragmented and over-
politicised approach. 
Furthermore, the media and politicians should 
abstain from spreading misinformation about the 
impact of immigrants on the UK, and should instead 
acknowledge the multitude of immigrants’ economic, 
social and cultural contributions to the UK.
Ultimately, the Brexit-prompted policy overhaul 
should be seen as an opportunity to improve the  
UK’s immigration system and the working conditions 
of all immigrants, and to create an environment for 
more responsible, transparent, and evidence-based 
public debates.
6EU Immigrants in the UKBRITAIN IN EUROPE THINK TANK, GOLDSMITHS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
TA B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S
A Contentious Policy Issue  7
Origins of the Current Points-Based System  7
The Current PBS Proposal  8
General Critique of the Proposed Framework  9
Where Do EU Nationals Stand?  11
EU Students’ Access to the UK  12
Impact on Migration from Central and Eastern Europe  15
The Road Ahead  16
Bibliography  17
7EU Immigrants in the UKBRITAIN IN EUROPE THINK TANK, GOLDSMITHS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
A  C O N T E N T I O U S  P O L I C Y  I S S U E
3 At the time of the Eastern Enlargement, no direct transitional mobility restrictions 
were imposed in the UK because the anticipated CEE mobility was insignificant 
and one of Tony Blair’s aspirations was to be seen as leading Europe. Concerns 
regarding CEE movers were only picked up in political debates after the results 
of the 2010 Census were published, in the midst of an already tumultuous 
environment due to the 2008 economic crisis.
4 If anything, Covid-19 actually increased support for immigration, at least into 
health and social care sectors.
5 Public concern might be on the rise again, however, due to the recently increased 
Channel crossings by undocumented migrants, fuelled at least in part by refugee 
camp evictions in France.
6 EU nationals currently present in the UK have until 30 June 2021 to apply for 
settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.
7 Unless extended, 1 January 2021.
8 Notably, the free movement right has not been consistently supported by any of 
the mainstream political parties, albeit it has been used as a rallying cry to garner 
support for other political goals.
Immigration has long been a divisive issue in the UK, often mis-used 
by populist politicians and the media to prompt resentment against 
Brussels, Westminster and the migrant community. EU citizens’ mobility 
to the UK began to feature more prominently in immigration debates 
after the EU’s Eastern Enlargement, which saw the admission of ten 
Central and Eastern European (‘CEE’) states in 2004 and 2007. The 
subsequent increase in east-to-west mobility eventually prompted 
rising support for anti-immigration initiatives,3 including the Brexit 
referendum. The fact that Brexit is going ahead and the havoc induced 
by the Covid-19 crisis4 appear to have reduced, at least temporarily, both 
immigration to the UK and the salience of immigration as an issue of 
media concern or public worries.5
However, immigration remains a highly contentious and complicated 
policy issue today, which became apparent again this summer. The 
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill, 
which ends EU nationals’ freedom of movement, was introduced to 
the House of Lords in July and is now in the Committee stage. Other 
than ending free movement, its purpose and goals are not clear, and 
it does not comprise substantive immigration law. Being skeletal and 
vague, the Bill gives the Home Office the responsibility to flesh out new 
policies regarding how all immigrants are to be approached in the future. 
Notably, the Home Secretary is given the power to amend primary and 
secondary laws through any regulations considered ‘appropriate’ in 
connection with any part of the Bill. Such an approach provides little 
legal certainty to the migrant community. Furthermore, immigration 
returned to the forefront of hotly debated topics after the Home Office 
published ‘The UK’s Points-Based Immigration System - Further Details’ 
and after Home Secretary Priti Patel issued an accompanying statement 
to present the new points-based immigration system (‘PBS’) that is to 
apply to all immigrants, including EU citizens who lack settled or pre-
settled status,6 when the Brexit transition period ends.7 
O R I G I N S  O F  T H E  C U R R E N T  P O I N T S -B A S E D 
SYST E M
The current PBS was first discussed in some detail in Theresa May’s long- 
awaited December 2018 White Paper on ‘The UK’s future skills-based 
immigration system’. That proposal would have ended EU citizens’ free 
movement8 and replaced it with a new sponsored system for all immigrant 
workers, with a salary threshold of £30,000. Unlike the pre-existing system 
for non-EU migrants, the plan would have reduced skills threshold to 
The Immigration Bill may create 
new problems for the UK tomorrow 
without resolving the challenges 
Britain faces today.
Roger Casale, Secretary General & 
CEO, New Europeans; ‘Britain in Europe’ 
thinktank expert
The bill makes use of undemocratic 
so-called ‘Henry VIII powers’, 
providing a skeleton structure 
rather than substantive law, thereby 
leaving the Home Office to flesh out 
the manner in which the migrant 
community will be treated. In this 
way, the Home Office will be able to 
allow immigration policy to shift 
according to the changing politics 
of the day, maintaining the over-
politicised nature of this issue.
Julie Ward, Member of the European 
Parliament (2014 – 2020); ‘Britain in 
Europe’ thinktank expert
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RQF3 (A-level), removed the resident labour-market test (‘RLMT’) under 
which employers have to show that there is no suitably qualified British 
candidate for the role, and would have been uncapped. Also unlike 
pre-existing rules, the White Paper envisioned a route, likely capped but 
not requiring work sponsorship, for temporary workers from designated 
‘low-risk countries’ (including at least some EU countries) who could apply 
for one-year visas. This transitional route targeted to low-waged workers 
— conflated by the Government with occupying ‘low-skill’ and ‘unskilled’ 
positions9 — was to be reviewed in 2025. Workers on these one-year visas 
would not be able to bring family members, and would need to return to 
their home countries for a one-year cooling-off period before being eligible 
for another visa. Although the Migration Advisory Committee did not 
recommend any provisions specifically for ‘low-skill’ workers, the Home 
Office included this transitional route in recognition of the fact that many 
British employers had become reliant on EU workers for certain low-paid 
jobs and would find it difficult to adapt their recruitment models, particularly 
in sectors like agriculture, hospitality, construction and social care. If 
implemented, the White Paper’s framework was predicted to reduce the 
UK workforce by approximately 300,000 EU nationals during 2021-25, 
and the GDP in 2025 by 0.4-0.9″%, with a cumulative fiscal cost of £2-4 
billion. The proposal was critiqued for deterring EU citizens from coming 
to the UK and for encouraging EU nationals living in the UK to leave.10 
The EU withdrawal bill which embodied these proposals was introduced 
under May’s minority government in December 2018, but stalled after 
the Committee stage and then fell when Parliament was prorogued in 
September 2019. 
9 In line with the approach taken by the Migration Advisory Committee, the ‘high’, 
‘low’, and ‘un’-skilled labels are based on the skill of the job rather than of the 
worker, i.e., the length of time it takes to train workers to do a specific job.
10 E.g., Casale, Roger, UK White Paper sounds death knell for freedom of movement, 
The Parliament Magazine: Politics, Policy and People, 21 December 2018, https://
www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/uk-white-paper-sounds-death-knell-
for-freedom-of-movement. 
11 Deceptively named ‘health and care visa’, despite not including social care workers.
12 The Government’s promise to remove NHS surcharge fees for healthcare workers 
was made during the Covid-19 lockdown and, as of the writing of this paper, has 
not been implemented yet, although healthcare workers can now apply for a 
refund of immigration health surcharge paid on or after 31 March 2020. See 
https://www.gov.uk/healthcare-immigration-application/refunds (last visited 22 
August 2020).
13 £1,000 per skilled worker for the first 12 months, with an additional £500 charge 
for each subsequent six-month period.
T H E  C U R R E N T  P B S  P R O P O SA L
The currently proposed PBS framework, as first detailed in February 2020 
and further explained in July, lowered the general salary threshold to 
£25,600 for the ‘skilled’ (RQF3) employer-sponsored route, and added 
the English-language requirement. As outlined in the 2018 White Paper, 
there is no RLMT and no numerical cap on ‘skilled’ workers. Further points 
are awarded for meeting various non-mandatory criteria, such as holding 
a PhD relevant to the job or earning more than £25,600. Those with a job 
offer in a ‘shortage occupation’ (to be designated later this year by the 
Migration Advisory Committee), such as nursing or civil engineering, are 
awarded extra points and are eligible for a visa at lower salary thresholds. 
In part as a response to the pandemic, within the ‘skilled’ worker route, 
there will be a fast-track entry for eligible healthcare workers,11 with 
reduced application fees, no immigration health surcharge fees,12 and 
dedicated support with the application process. Similarly to the current 
system, most employers of ‘skilled’ workers will have to pay the 
Immigration Skills Charge for each skilled worker.13 The Government is 
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also contemplating an unsponsored route within the PBS for ‘highly skilled’ 
workers, which will be capped. The pre-existing uncapped routes for 
innovators, exceptional talent and investors from non-EU states will 
become available to EU nationals as well. None of such workers will qualify 
for public benefits or for a waiver of the health surcharge fees,14 although 
they will be able to bring their dependents here. Furthermore, a dedicated, 
capped programme for seasonal agricultural workers might become 
implemented, based on agreements with specific countries.15 There is no 
designated programme for self-employed individuals (although those with 
exceptional talent or UK ancestry may be self-employed), and no provisions 
for ‘unskilled’ workers. Dependants joining immigrant workers will be 
able to undertake employment at any skill level. Unlike the 2018 White 
Paper, the current proposal has no route for short-term ‘low-skill’ workers. 
Aside from strictly work-based visas, the capped Youth Mobility Scheme 
for those aged 18-30 is likely to be extended to include at least some 
non-English speaking countries, pursuant to which young adults from 
participating countries will be able to undertake employment or study in 
the UK for 2 years. Moreover, international students will be able to remain 
in the UK for two years (or three years, for PhD graduates) after finishing 
their studies to work or to seek employment. EU tourists will not need a 
visa for stays of less than six months.
14 Other than for eligible healthcare workers.
15 Any such temporary or seasonal migration schemes present significant risks of 
labour abuse and exploitation, including human trafficking. See Focus on Labour 
Exploitation, Disposable Workers: the Future of the UK’s Migrant Workforce, March 
2019, https://www.labourexploitation.org/publications/disposable-workers-future-
uks-migrant-workforce; Focus on Labour Exploitation, Preventing exploitation in 
the shadow of Brexit: The risks of temporary migration programmes, September 
2018, https://www.labourexploitation.org/publications/preventing-exploitation-
shadow-brexit-risks-temporary-migration-programmes.
16 In fact, net non-EU migration has been noticeably increasing since 2013 and is 
currently at the highest level since arrivals began to be recorded in 1975, in part 
due to the relaxation of the cap on Tier 2 skilled visas in late 2018.
17 In line with UKIP’s tactic to appeal to BAME referendum voters by promising that 
Brexit would enable increased non-EU immigration.
G E N E R A L  C R I T I Q U E  O F  T H E  P R O P O S E D 
F R A M E WO R K
What is immediately striking about this PBS is that, despite the 
Conservative Party’s ongoing promises to reduce immigration, the new 
framework imposes no numerical cap and no RLMT on ‘skilled’ labour. 
It has made it easier for employers to sponsor migrant workers than it 
has been to sponsor non-EU migrants. It is difficult, of course, to predict 
the overall impact of the new system on immigration numbers. Given 
the fact that the British economy is likely to suffer more severely from 
the Covid-19 crisis than any other economy in the developed world, it 
is uncertain how likely the UK will be able to attract the ‘brightest and 
best’ to work and study here as part of the Government’s ‘Global Britain’ 
strategy. What is clear, however, is that historically, non-EU immigration 
has been higher than EU mobility16 and has been increasing17 in recent 
years, while EU migration has been notably decreasing since the Brexit 
referendum in June 2016. The proposed immigration framework will likely 
exacerbate these trends. Given how many British nationals have become 
unemployed or furloughed (and at risk of subsequently losing their jobs) 
due to the pandemic, noticeably increased immigration numbers might 
prompt a future backlash against immigration policies. This is especially 
The de-standardisation of professional 
qualifications, such as those for doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, architects, etc., 
may limit the attraction of the UK 
for ‘highly’ skilled EU professionals, 
whilst the increased bureaucracy and 
high penalties for infractions will 
deter sole traders, the self-employed 
and business entrepreneurs, as well 
as students who will increasingly look 
to the EU where a common education 
area is being developed.
Julie Ward, Member of the European 
Parliament (2014 – 2020); ‘Britain in 
Europe’ thinktank expert 
The PBS fails to address any of the 
problems of our immigration system 
- including extortionate visa fees, 
the NHS health surcharge and the 
exclusion of migrants from public 
support - and instead is extending 
these rules to EU citizens. We need 
a fair immigration system which 
treats migrants with flexibility and 
dignity, including the lower paid. 
The only way to do this is to end these 
inhumane policies and the Hostile 
Environment which upholds them.
Caitlin Boswell, Project Officer (EU 
Citizens), The Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants
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likely since, despite pre-referendum populist allegations of how EU 
movers have been stealing (low-skill) British jobs, immigrants will now be 
more likely to displace British workers from ‘skilled’ and higher-paid jobs. 
Furthermore, despite being hailed by the Government as employer-driven, 
the new PBS framework is anticipated to produce labour shortages in 
several sectors, including those recognised as essential during the 
Covid-19 crisis (i.e., social care,18 farming,19 and food processing), as well 
as in hospitality and construction.20 The Home Secretary has suggested 
that, rather than relying on foreign labour, British employers should turn 
to automation technologies or should invest in British workers21 - especially 
given the recently increasing rates of unemployment (currently at 4%, but 
expected to rise to 11-15% by the end of the year). But how realistic is that? 
Employers’ organisations22 and many MPs worry that the impact (at least 
short-term) on many businesses, especially small and medium-sized23 ones, 
will be catastrophic because many of such ‘low-skilled’ positions are 
unappealing to British workers due to low pay, demanding work, and poor 
career prospects. Moreover, many of such jobs require skills for which few 
domestic workers have been trained. These skills typically also cannot 
be replaced by automation (which, ironically, would further displace British 
workers). Although ‘low-skill’ labour needs might continue to be at least in 
part filled by the more than three million EU citizens and their dependents 
already working in the UK with settled or pre-settled status, it is not clear 
how many of them will actually decide to live here permanently, especially 
given the propensity of EU workers in low-skill jobs to engage in temporary 
and circular migration, and the fact that the remaining 27 EU countries will 
remain wide open to them. The resultant anticipated labour shortages are 
likely to increase consumer costs or even prompt some British businesses 
to move overseas or outsource parts of their operations abroad. Some 
might even be forced to close, especially given the fallout from the 
Covid-19 crisis.
18 Due to the minimum income threshold barriers and not falling under the new fast-
track arrangement for healthcare workers. Casale, Roger, UK immigration policy 
casts shadow over social care sector, EU Today, 16 July 2020, https://eutoday.net/
news/politics/2020/uk-immigration-policy-casts-shadow-over-social-care-sector. 
19 For example, the National Farmers’ Union has been vocal about its labour 
shortages, further exacerbated by Covid-19. See NFU, Media coverage on 
immigration and access to labour, https://www.nfuonline.com/news/latest-news/
media-coverage-on-immigration-and-access-to-labour/ (last accessed 7 Aug 
2020).
20 Economic concerns aside, what is also troubling is that the new immigration 
framework has been rushed during the pandemic, with little oversight. Moreover, 
the Bill gives the Home Secretary sweeping powers to effectuate the new 
framework through Immigration Rules and secondary legislation. In addition 
to being overly complicated and disjoined, akin to secondary legislation, 
Immigration Rules are subject to lesser parliamentary scrutiny than primary laws, 
and tend to reflect priorities of the Home Office rather than political consensus. 
They are also more likely to be changed over time than primary law is, further 
undermining legal certainty in the new system. 
21 In April, the Government launched ‘Pick for Britain’ programme, and agricultural 
providers launched ‘Feed the Nation’ campaign to entice British nationals to work 
on farms over the busy harvest period.
22 Including UKHospitality, National Farmers’ Union, and Association of Labour 
Providers.
23 Big businesses will find it easier to fill any gaps in EU migration with non-EU 
migrants.
The rewriting of immigration 
legislation in this way is the final death 
knell, in law, to the liberal approach to 
mobility that Freedom of Movement 
represented. The removal of privileged 
rights for EU citizens, while cast by the 
Home Office as making the system 
fairer, is a levelling down for all those 
seeking to live and work in the UK. As 
such, it is the legal enactment and 
institutionalisation of an increasingly 
exclusionary political project of 
belonging in Britain in the hands of the 
Conservative Government.
Dr Michaela Benson, Reader in Sociology, 
Goldsmiths, University of London; expert 
and advisory board member, ‘Britain in 
Europe’ thinktank
A sponsorship process creates an 
imbalanced power dynamic between 
the sponsor and the sponsored, with 
the potential of leaving the sponsored 
migrant worker in a vulnerable 
situation. For example, any employer 
that sponsors migrant workers needs 
to comply with robust sponsorship 
license rules. These can be costly, and 
some employers will not be able to 
afford legal compliance advice. If the 
employer fails to comply, then the 
sponsored worker immediately 
becomes at risk, and may be deemed to 
be of ‘irregular’ immigration status. 
[Moreover,] … the sponsorship scheme 
… is likely to exacerbate exploitation 
and modern slavery because employers 
who have invested significantly in the 
sponsorship will want to ensure they 
recoup the investment, and ensure they 
do not move to an alternative employer.
Fizza Qureshi, Chief Executive Officer, 
Migrants’ Rights Network 
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What is especially troublesome from workers’ perspective is that the 
employer-sponsorship route might increase exploitation.24 After all, an 
employer who had invested in sponsoring a worker is incentivised to 
exert pressure on that worker to remain in their employment or may seek 
to recover the costs of sponsorship. In addition, if an employer fails to 
correctly comply with sponsorship requirements,25 sponsored workers 
become at risk of having ‘irregular’ immigration status. 
24 More generally, suddenly restricting lawful migration and expanding temporary-
visa routes (such as in agriculture) results in more undocumented work, which 
leads to increased vulnerability and hence exploitation. Farron, Tim and Lucila 
Granada, Government immigration plans risk increase in modern slavery, 
Politics, 19 May 2020, https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2020/05/19/
government-immigration-plans-risk-increase-in-modern-slavery. 
25 Small and medium-sized businesses, in particular, will struggle to meet the 
onerous sponsorship compliance requirements. This will also expose them to civil 
and potentially criminal penalties.
26 Latest available data indicates that, in December 2019, there were more than 
800,000 Poles, 400,000 Romanians, 300,000 Irish, 280,000 Germans, and 
230,000 Italians living here.
27 During the Covid-19 lockdown, the Home Office was not accepting documents 
for ID verification purposes. As a result, EU nationals were unable to apply for pre-
settled or settled status for a period of approximately 2 months.
28 An ongoing concern is that even if a small percentage of EU citizens in the UK fail 
to register before the deadline on 30 June 2021, this will translate into thousands 
becoming irregular migrants, including groups especially vulnerable. See, e.g., 
Jabłonowski, Kuba, EU Settlement Scheme: the cliff-edge approach puts many 
vulnerable applicants at risk, LSE Brexit Blog, 27 January 2020, https://blogs.
lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/01/27/eu-settlement-scheme-the-cliff-edge-approach-
puts-many-vulnerable-applicants-at-risk/. Especially vulnerable groups of EU 
citizens include children in the care system (see, e.g., CORAM, Children left out? 
Securing children’s rights to stay in the UK beyond Brexit, July 2020, https://www.
childrenslegalcentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CCLC-Children-left-out_
July-2020_final.pdf) and the Roma community (see, e.g., Williams, Luna, What will 
Brexit mean for the Roma community?, 19 February 2020 (Electronic Immigration 
Network) https://www.ein.org.uk/blog/what-will-brexit-mean-roma-community). 
W H E R E  D O  E U  N AT I O N A L S  STA N D ?
The Brexit referendum and the impending end of free movement 
have already changed the mobility patterns of EU citizens to the UK. 
In addition to an increase in hate crimes against EU nationals, the 
referendum caused legal uncertainties and a resultant increase in EU 
workers’ exploitation in the labour market. Although overall there are 
still more EU nationals arriving in the UK than leaving,26 EU net migration 
has fallen substantially, following peak levels in 2015-16. In 2019, net 
EU migration stood at 49,000. No accurate estimates exist of how 
many EU nationals currently present in the UK are eligible for the EU 
Settlement Scheme. As of now, however, more than 3.8 m applications27 
have been made under the Scheme - with Polish (700,000), Romanian 
(600,000), and Italian (400,000) nationals submitting the highest 
numbers of applications.28 Slightly more than 2 m have been granted 
settled status, entitling them to the same rights to live, work, and access 
healthcare and public funds as UK citizens, and making them eligible for 
UK citizenship after one year. Moreover, 1.4 m have received pre-settled 
status, available to EU citizens who have not lived in the UK for five years 
by the end of 2020. This limited leave to remain allows them to continue 
to live and work here for five years, but they must re-apply to change to 
settled status—available as soon as they accrue five years of ‘continuous 
residence’—before their pre-settled status expires. Notably, pre-settled 
status carries risks and provides EU nationals with only limited rights. For 
one, it does not constitute ‘right to reside’ for the purposes of welfare 
benefits. It will be revoked if its bearer is away from the UK for two 
consecutive years, and the ‘continuous residence’ period required to 
change to settled status cannot be met if more than 6 months are spent 
overseas in any 12-month period. 
The Home Office states that ‘Brexit 
should mean “a robust and consistent 
approach to applying the UK criminality 
thresholds rules”, treating EU citizens 
in the same way as arrivals from 
elsewhere’. But this is diametrically 
opposed to, and defies the logic of, the 
“settled status” promise, that EU 
citizens in the UK would be treated the 
same as UK citizens, that there would 
be no material change to the rights they 
were exercising before. With deportation 
for the commission of minor offences as 
the Sword of Damocles hanging over 
their head, EU citizens cannot possibly 
feel they are treated as UK citizens. In 
the aftermath of the EU referendum, EU 
citizens have invariably reported 
feeling “in limbo”, emotionally and as 
reflected in law (in the face of the UK 
government’s initial continuous long- 
term refusal to recognise their rights). 
Now the UK government is, once again, 
proving they were right to be worried; 
this “greyness of things”, where 
everything is “tangled, mingled, not 
perfect anymore” – to speak like a 
character from Anne Tyler’s “Dinner 
at the Homesick Restaurant” – is how 
they are being made to feel, at best, 
about their right to stay in the UK.
Prof Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Head 
of the Department of Law, Goldsmiths, 
University of London; founder and 
director, ‘Britain in Europe’ thinktank
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Notably, the new immigration framework states that, after the end of the 
transition period, even those with settled status ‘must be considered 
for deportation’ if they are sentenced to 1 year or more of imprisonment 
for conduct committed after 1 January 2021. Where this deportation 
threshold is not met, settled EU nationals may be considered for 
deportation if it is conducive to the public good, including if they have 
serious or persistent criminality. This is despite repeated Government 
promises that settled EU nationals would have the same rights as British 
nationals. One wonders if the spectre of the Windrush scandal might 
reappear in this new context, as EU migrants will now be swept under 
the UK’s overarching hostile environment policy towards immigration. 
Such concerns appear especially worrisome given that neither the 
settled nor pre-settled status includes physical documentation. Instead, 
status can be confirmed only through access to an online account, 
which inspires little security for its holders and has already made it 
difficult for some EU nationals to prove their entitlement to enter and 
access basic rights like housing in the UK. 
When it comes to newly arriving EU nationals or those who will not obtain 
settled or pre-settled status, access to the UK after 1 January 2021 will 
become much more restrictive and more expensive than it has been. The 
new PBS is predicted to reduce to zero arrivals of EU workers seeking 
employment in low-skill occupations (such as process, plant and machine 
operatives) and in elementary occupations, while inflows of EU workers 
into caring and leisure services are likely to be cut by 90%, and into skilled 
trades occupations by approximately 50%. Notably, while recent public 
and media support for migrants in key sectors might have helped to drive 
certain policy changes beneficial to immigrants working in the NHS,29 the 
new PBS would have likely excluded many of those same key workers from 
entering the UK. Many sectors that have been designated as filled with ‘key 
workers’ during the Covid-19 crisis are likely to be significantly impacted 
– with an anticipated reduction of almost half in EU medical services 
workers, 70% of EU social workers, 80% of EU care workers, and more than 
90% of EU warehouse and transportation staff.30 Such predictions are 
based on PBS eligibility criteria alone. These reductions in EU key workers 
are likely to be even more severe in practice given how unappealing the 
UK will become. Ending new EU workers’ eligibility for public benefits31 
and requiring them to pay immigration health surcharge will likely 
significantly reduce EU workers’ interest in entering the UK, particularly 
given their continuing access to the right of free movement and ancillary 
rights in the remaining EU states. 
29 Such as the proposed cancellation of the NHS surcharge, and assurances that 
dependants of NHS workers who die as a result of Covid-19 will receive indefinite 
leave to remain.
30 Although EU-born workers comprise 7% of the British workforce, they have been 
over-represented among key workers in the manufacturing (22%), scientific and 
professional (11%), and transport and storage (11%) sectors.
31 They will have ‘no recourse to public fund’ conditions on their visa.
E U  ST U D E N T S ’  AC C E S S  TO  T H E  U K
In addition, EU students will no longer be entitled to home-fee status 
or student loans. This is anticipated to reduce EU student enrolment 
by 20%, although the Covid-19 crisis might have further diminished EU 
students’ interest in studying in the UK. This policy change will especially 
impact students from EU states with lower GDPs and average wages, 
such as from the CEE region. Overall, withdrawing home fee status from 
EU students will expose the HE sector to an even greater financial crisis 
than it is already experiencing.
From January 1st 2021 EU citizens will 
be the only group of foreign residents 
in the UK who have a digital-only 
immigration status and no backup 
option of physical proof…. Not having 
a biometric ID document could result 
in a person’s failure to open a bank 
account, get a driving licence, secure 
housing or a job, perhaps being 
passed over for an applicant with the 
ability to produce an actual passport. 
Years down the line, remembering 
your computer-generated code and 
the original email address that was 
linked to it could become a serious 
stumbling block, particularly for 
vulnerable people.
Julie Ward, Member of the European 
Parliament (2014 – 2020); ‘Britain in 
Europe’ thinktank expert
The COVID pandemic has revealed 
that the people previously considered 
‘low-skilled’ such as carers, cleaners 
and delivery drivers, are in fact the 
backbone of our society. And yet the 
Government has introduced a new 
PBS which will make it impossible for 
many essential workers to live and 
work safely in the UK. 
Caitlin Boswell, Project Officer (EU 
Citizens), The Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants
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On 23 June 2020, the Minister of State for Universities, 
Michelle Donelan, used a blunt, unceremonious 
statement to the House of Commons to confirm that “[f]
ollowing [the UK’s] decision to leave the EU, EU, other 
EEA and Swiss nationals will no longer be eligible for 
home fee status, undergraduate, postgraduate and 
advanced learner financial support from Student Finance 
England for courses starting in academic year 2021/22”. 
She went on to briefly acknowledge that “EU, other 
EEA and Swiss students, staff and researchers make an 
important contribution to our universities” and that she 
“want[s] that contribution to continue and [is] confident 
– given the world-leading quality of our higher education 
sector – that it will”.  
 
Not many will have taken notice of the announcement that 
brought to an abrupt end a relationship that benefited 
more than a million students in the last ten years alone 
(according to HESA student records relating to 2008-09 to 
2017-18, as reported by Universities UK, the total number 
of EU students in the UK ranged from 117.850 in 2008-
09 to 139.145 in 2017-18, with an overall population of 
1.282.775 students in this ten-year period). The minister 
did not make any announcement on social media or other 
official platform; there was simply no effort to reach out to 
– and empathise with – EU students who might be making 
plans to come study in the UK from 2021-22 onwards, to 
reassure them that the minister’s statement, that she 
“want[s] that contribution [from EU students] to continue”, 
is not going to be an empty promise.  
 
Just the day before her statement in the House of Commons, 
the minister had written an open letter to all international 
students (to reassure them of the measures that the UK 
had taken to safeguard their health, safety and wellbeing, 
in light of the global impact of the Covid-19 pandemic), 
and spoken about it in her social media. But there was 
no sign of a similar intention to communicate with EU 
students, to explain to them how the Brexit-induced 
changes, on student fees and loans, would – severely – 
affect their ability to study in the UK in the future. Or 
perhaps to communicate to them that the UK government 
would ensure strategies would be adopted that would 
facilitate the transition to the new post-Brexit world.  
 
There has been no visible effort to connect with EU 
students since then either. No looking back, at all the 
attributes, skillsets and cultural diversity this vibrant 
community of students had brought to the UK, and no 
looking forward, at how they would be supported in 
continuing to make these invaluable contributions to 
British society in the future. 
 
No looking back, and no looking forward, in relation 
to what this change in policy would mean for our 
Universities either, not just from a financial perspective, 
where there will undoubtedly be substantial damage, 
but culturally and educationally too; students from the 
EU have become an indispensable part of the student 
experience in our Universities, and losing them, or losing 
a significant number of them, will inevitably have a 
dire effect. As Nick Hillman, the Director of the Higher 
Education Policy Institute (HEPI), said in responding to 
the minister’s announcement on tuition fees and loans:
In the past, we have shown that higher fees and no more 
access to student loans could risk a decline of around 
60% in the number of EU students coming to the UK to 
study. If that happens, our universities will be less 
diverse and less open to influences from other countries.
The statement from HEPI’s Director went on to predict 
that if “we adopt sensible post-Brexit migration rules and 
if universities work very hard to recruit from other EU 
nations, it is likely that many of our fellow Europeans 
will still wish to study here”, concluding that “[a]bove all, 
we need to make it abundantly clear to people from the 
EU and beyond that our universities remain open to all”.  
 
There are simply too many “ifs” here, when looking at 
how we might avoid EU students deserting our Universities, 
and recent trends do not leave much room for optimism: 
we are already experiencing a significant reduction in 
the number of EU student enrolments. As reported in the 
Financial Times, “the Russell Group recorded 23,310 EU 
students starting studies for the 2018/19 academic year, 
down 3 per cent on 2017/18”, which came “after a 7 per 
cent rise in enrolment in 2016/17 and increases in most 
years during the past decade”. 
 
A narrative of openness and connectedness with EU 
member states – and their citizens – should, of course, be 
an absolute starting point, for the Minister of State for 
Universities, and the UK government, more broadly, if 
the UK is interested in remaining a primary academic 
destination for EU students.  
 
Unfortunately, there are so far no signs of such a narrative, 
regardless of whether we look at high level policy – with 
remaining uncertainty on the future relationship with 
the EU and a “no deal” outcome still a possibility or the 
new point-based immigration system leading to a 
significant decrease of EU migration, as Dr Myslinska 
concludes in this report – or whether we take a more 
impressionistic view; as mentioned above, there has been 
virtually no effort from the Minister of State for 
Universities to communicate the changes of fees and 
student loans to a wider audience, primarily EU students, 
as if these are not going to affect EU students or as if these 
students do not matter. 
 
Let us assume, for the moment, that this is going to 
change, and that the government, with support from 
universities, will do an outstanding work sharing with 
EU students the seeming inevitability of the new approach 
to fees and loans, and their commitment to EU students 
continuing to be a vital part of the international student 
community in UK universities. Still, it will not be enough 
to enable them to come study in the UK. For a significant 
number of students from the EU, studying in the UK will 
simply no longer be a financially viable choice. A 2019 
survey of typical fees for overseas students (included in a 
recent House of Commons Library briefing paper on 
international and EU students in higher education) gave 
averages of £14,900 (classroom-based) and £17,000 
(lab-based) for undergraduate programmes, and, 
similarly, averages of £15,100 (classroom-based) and 
£17,500 (lab-based) for postgraduate programmes. To take 
the example of studying for the LLB Law degree at one of 
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the Law Schools at the University of London, EU students 
will now be likely to face tuition fees that will range 
between £15,000 and £23,000, as opposed to the annual 
fees of £9,250 that they were paying until now. The vast 
majority of these students were relying on tuition fee loans 
from the British government; an estimated 69 percent of 
eligible EU full-time undergraduates took out fee loans in 
2014-15, according to the same House of Commons 
Library paper mentioned above, which also reports that 
though EU students “are not generally eligible for 
maintenance loans […] some students may qualify if they 
meet residency criteria”. 
 
Losing access to loans and facing estimated tuition fee 
increases of between 75 and 125 percent is likely therefore 
to emerge as an insurmountable obstacle for EU students 
wishing to study in the UK in the near future, especially 
for those coming from the economies with low GDP and 
average wage in the European South and in Eastern 
European member states.  
 
The reaction from Cyprus, with reports of “students 
writ[ing] off UK Universities”, and Cyprus “hoping to 
strike a bilateral agreement with Britain, to allow 
Cypriot students to continue with their studies at English 
Universities without paying higher tuition fees”, provides 
a good illustration. I have been similarly raising red flags 
about this in the Greek press for a few years now, in the 
context of the Brexit debate, and discussing the arising 
complications with educational experts in the country, 
and everyone seems genuinely puzzled about how it 
might be possible to secure for Greek students continued 
access to UK higher education institutions in the future. 
It is useful to remind here that there are approximately 
ten thousand students from Greece that enrol with UK 
Universities every year (if we look back at statistical data 
between 2014-15 and 2018-19), and the same number for 
students from Cyprus is approximately nine thousand 
per year. Greece is also in the top 10 of countries of origin 
for all international students, in the same group with 
major countries of origin such as China, India, the 
United States and Germany, which occupy the top four 
places in that list. 
 
Eastern European students seem to have reacted with the 
same level of disbelief and pessimism about access to UK 
higher education in the future, with some of them 
reporting that the loss of home fee status “will be a full 
stop for [them]”. Gábor Csontos, a recent graduate of 
Cambridge University, who worked for a year as access 
officer at the Cambridge University Hungarian Society, 
boldly put it in the Guardian that the Minister of 
University’s statement, that she was confident that the 
contribution of EU students would continue (despite the 
change in fee status), simply “ignored the material reality 
of the situations most of [Eastern Europeans] studying in 
the UK come from”; Csontos had in mind “anyone 
coming from an average family from Poland, Romania 
or Hungary”.  
 
Csontos’ key emphasis was also rightly placed on how 
these changes would be “a blow for social mobility in 
Europe”. The minister may be right to say that the 
“world-leading quality of British higher education will 
keep attracting students from all the world and Europe”, 
he pointed out, “[h]owever, fewer [can] now afford it, 
and those who can will be members of established elites”. 
That will be as true for Poland, Romania and Hungary 
as it will be for Greece and Cyprus; those from privileged 
backgrounds will perhaps still be able to pursue 
academic studies in Oxbridge and Russell group 
Universities, but everyone else will have no option but to 
pursue academic excellence in parts of Europe where 
they will still be welcome, in practice, not just in words. It 
must be added here that EU member states that already 
are, or now emerge as, leading academic providers in 
Europe are alert to the radical transformation UK higher 
education is undergoing, mainly as a result of Brexit. 
They appear ready to increase the competition to UK 
higher education institutions, and stand to benefit from 
the unprecedented lack of planning and support from 
the part of the UK government. 
 
Serious questions can also be raised about why the decision 
to change the fee status of students from the EU could not 
have been delayed, to give higher education institutions 
in the country some much needed “breathing space”, when 
they are faced with extraordinary challenges in the light 
of the global pandemic, and at a time when no one still 
knows what the future relationship with the EU is going 
to be. Or about why there has been no apparent attempt 
to investigate reciprocal agreements with the EU on 
tuition fees. Spain, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
are amongst the top international destinations for mobile 
UK students, whose access to Universities there could have 
been facilitated by such reciprocal agreements; we are 
rather currently faced with uncertainty about the type of 
arrangement that is going to apply to UK students 
wishing to study abroad in the future. We must underline 
that currently 7.8 percent of UK undergraduate students 
work, study or volunteer overseas as part of their degree; 
attempts to increase this number (such as in the context 
of the UUK Go International’s campaign, which aimed to 
bring international mobility up to 13 percent by 2020) 
will by definition considerably slow down, if they are not 
halted altogether. 
 
This quick overview inevitably leads one to conclude  
that the UK government must change tack, on EU students 
in the UK, if we are to avoid losing one of the most 
intellectually and culturally vibrant parts of the student 
community in our universities: collaborative work with 
EU member states, efficient, empathetic communication 
with students from the EU but, more importantly, 
programmes facilitating access to our Universities for 
those, in our European neighbourhood, most in need of 
financial and practical support to study here, should be 
obvious points of departure.
Prof Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos,  
Head of the Department of Law, Goldsmiths, 
University of London; founder and director of the 
‘Britain in Europe’ thinktank  
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I M PAC T  O N  M I G R AT I O N  F R O M  C E N T R A L  A N D 
E A ST E R N  E U R O P E
CEE nationals had experienced the most antagonistic public climate in 
the run-up to the referendum and a post-referendum spike in hate 
crimes against them.32 Despite having been the greatest net contributors 
to the British public purse among all the immigrant groups (and 
significantly greater net contributors than native British workers), they 
have been targeted by Brexit supporters and populist rhetoric. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, CEE nationals have been turning away from the UK in 
the past few years. Since the Brexit referendum, more CEE nationals 
have been leaving the UK than arriving here. For example, at the end of 
2019, there was a net loss of 12,000 in migration from the eight CEE 
states that had joined the EU in 2004. This will likely be further 
exacerbated by Covid-induced job losses, especially high among those 
precariously employed, as many CEE nationals have been.33 
Looking ahead, newly arriving CEE migrants are especially likely to be 
negatively impacted by the PBS, which prioritises ‘high-skill’, high-paid 
employment. CEE movers have tended to be over-represented in lower-
skilled and low-paid jobs – which are often precarious,34 and for which 
they are often overqualified35– including as key workers in the social care 
sector, farming, and food processing, as well as in hospitality and 
construction sectors. Seventeen per cent of all CEE workers are in key 
low-skilled jobs,36 the highest share among all migrant groups other than 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, most workers in agriculture--which is 
98% staffed by foreign workers--are Bulgarian and Romanian. Employers’ 
reliance on CEE workers in this sector is perhaps most poignantly 
illustrated by agricultural companies’ chartering of planes in recent 
months to bring seasonal Romanian farm workers to the UK. After the 
PBS becomes implemented, newly arriving CEE workers will no longer 
be able to access most of such positions. Furthermore, CEE nationals’ 
access to self-employment, especially common in the construction 
sector, will no longer be available. 
(Boldly) assuming that the UK continues to be appealing to new CEE 
workers, what is their likely fate given their pre-Brexit propensity to 
engage in low-paid, precarious employment? Unlike the 2018 White 
Paper, the current PBS framework provides no route for short-term ‘low-
skill’ workers. It is possible that the PBS will simply divert CEE workers 
into low-skill jobs via other migrant routes – especially the Youth Mobility 
Scheme or as family members joining EU immigrants. Perhaps it will 
32 See, e.g., Rzepnikowska, Alina (2019) Racism and xenophobia experienced by 
Polish migrants in the UK before and after Brexit vote, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 45(1): 61-77; Virdee, Satnam and Brendan McGeever (2018) 
Racism, Crisis, Brexit, Ethnic and Racial Studies 41(10): 1802-19.  
33 See, e.g., Barslund, Mikkel and Matthias Busse (2014) Labour Mobility in the 
EU: Dynamics, Patterns and Policies, Intereconomics 49(3): 116-158; Ciupijus, 
Zinovijus (2012) EU Citizens or Eastern European Labour Migrants? The Peculiar 
Case of Central Eastern Europeans in Britain, Politeja 2/3: 29-46; Cook, Joanne et 
al (2011) The Experiences of Accession 8 Migrants in England: Motivations, Work 
and Agency, International Migration 49(2): 54-79; East European Advice Centre 
(2013) East Europeans in London: A Peer Led Study of the Issues Faced by East 
Europeans in London Relating Housing, Employment, Household Income and 
Support Needs; Kofman, Eleonore et al (2009) The Equality Implications of Being 
a Migrant in Britain, Research Report 19 (EHRC); Office for National Statistics 
(2016) International immigration and the labour market, UK: 2016.  
34 Sirkeci, Ibrahim et al (2018) Barriers for Highly Qualified A8 Immigrants in the 
UK Labour Market, Work, Employment and Society 32(5): 906-24; Johnston, Ron 
et al (2015) East versus West? Over-qualification and Earnings among the UK’s 
European Migrants, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(2): 196-218.
35 It does beg the question of how much the UK actually values ‘skilled’ labour.
36 Seventeen per cent of CEE and 10% of EU-14 workers are in key low-skill jobs; 9% 
of CEE workers and 19% of EU-14 workers are in key high-skill positions.
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even push some into unlawful temporary employment (while on six-
month tourist visas). After all, harder borders do not stop people from 
entering, but instead push them into undocumented status and into 
exploitative labour and living arrangements. Although any such indirect 
effect of the PBS is unlikely to result in substantial numbers, it might 
exacerbate modern slavery issues. 
Incidentally, there might be a silver lining to the new system: since 
employers will not have access to an unlimited pool of revolving temporary 
workers, such workers’ pay and work conditions might improve. Moreover, 
those who have been willing to suffer de-skilling might now be forced to 
demand that their skills be recognised so that they are eligible to enter 
the UK under the PBS. On the other hand, the fate of skilled EU workers 
might worsen since their employment will be tied to specific sponsors, 
opening the door to potential exploitation - albeit with minimum pay 
requirements (assuming they are effectively enforced). And of course, 
not qualifying for social benefits or for healthcare without a surcharge 
will make living here much more challenging for all immigrants. 
37 And in fact, they might not even be finalised before the end of the year.
38 Of course, such lists pit industries against each other and tend to benefit 
employment sectors that have the resources and are organised sufficiently to 
influence policymaking.
39 This, of course, would benefit British workers as well - by preventing leveling 
down of labour conditions and by not displacing Britons with more easily 
exploitable foreign labour.
T H E  R OA D  A H E A D
Will the PBS prove to be an inflexible trap? It is too early to tell, and the 
new system will certainly need to be adjusted to respond to the UK’s 
economic needs (perhaps with some regional flexibility) and to the 
priorities of workers, consumers and businesses. What appears evident, 
however, is that in its current incarnation, the system is not as it has been 
advertised. Neither is it truly employer-driven nor does it seek to reduce 
overall immigration. Moreover, it does not appear particularly ‘fair’ or 
‘modern’ or conducive to a ‘global Britain’ strategy. Although the new PBS 
will likely reduce labour gaps for ‘highly’ skilled positions, it will likely create 
a new gap for ‘low’ skilled employment. Regardless of where a ‘shortage’ 
of workers exists, it will result in an unstable, inefficient economy. Moreover, 
the new framework is likely to increase worker exploitation.
What is also clear is that the PBS will significantly decrease EU migration, 
especially of CEE workers – the same workers who have been used as 
scapegoats by successive Governments for various failures of domestic 
policies and who have been demonised the most in the run up to the 
Brexit referendum, despite having made substantial contributions to the 
public purse. 
What can be done now? Since there are no specific regulations in place 
yet,37 advocacy groups should exert pressure on the Government to draft 
a comprehensive list of shortage occupations to include key workers and 
select positions classified as ‘low-skill’.38 To be truly employer-driven, the 
Government should take into account labour organisations’ concerns 
over shortages, the same concerns that had driven the UK to support the 
Eastern Enlargement process and the admission of CEE workers in the 
first place. Ultimately, the Brexit-prompted immigration policy overhaul 
should be seen as an opportunity to improve the UK’s immigration 
system and the working conditions of all immigrants.39 Hopefully, not 
only economic, but also ethical and human rights concerns will become 
a part of this conversation.
A functional society needs to value 
all its workers rather than obsess 
about out-dated notions of skill level. 
…. An unbalanced economy will not 
work smoothly; bankers can’t go to 
work without train drivers, scientists 
can’t work in labs that aren’t also a 
workplace for cleaners. 
Julie Ward, Member of the European 
Parliament (2014 – 2020); ‘Britain in 
Europe’ thinktank expert  
Designed to feed a xenophobic 
undercurrent in the Government’s 
political narrative, … the Immigration 
Bill sets a new benchmark for how 
far Britain has moved away from the 
open society that welcomed the world 
to the UK for the London Olympics in 
2012. No longer a beacon of freedom 
and human rights, the UK’s message 
to the world is now about as hostile 
and negative as it could be. The 
new Immigration Bill represents the 
culmination of that transition and 
may also lead to a significant decline 
in Britain’s international standing.
Roger Casale, Secretary General & 
CEO, New Europeans; ‘Britain in Europe’ 
thinktank expert
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